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XAbstract
Voice (having one’s say in an allocation procedure) was investigated 
for two different types of content (instrumental voice and expressive 
voice) associated with conditions of perceived intrumentality of voice 
and interactional fairness given by the allocator. One hundred and 
four undergraduate students at a midwestern university were used 
in a 2 x 2 factorial design. Data were collected from free form 
comments and a post-experimental questionnaire after subjects 
reacted to a simulated performance appraisal situation. Results did 
not show that voice content differed across conditions. Procedural 
justice perceptions were increased by a high level of interactional 




Research on fairness perceptions has developed rapidly in the 
past 25 years. Various aspects of fairness have been investigated as 
well as various meanings and consequences of fairness. The 
following discussion presents the procedural justice research to date 
as it has developed from its beginnings in equity theory.
Distributive justice has been well studied under the theory of 
equity as presented by Adams (1963, 1965). Equity in social and 
economic exchanges is defined by the ratio of outcomes received to 
costs or investments. An inequitable situation exists when one party 
receives more outcomes proportional to his/her investments, or 
inputs, than another party receives.
One consequence of inequity is an emotional state of distress 
which motivates a person to restore the inequitable situation to a 
more equitable exchange. Equity may be achieved by adjusting the 
inputs or the outputs of either party in such a way that the 
investment-to-outcome ratios being compared match each other 
more closely. According to equity theory, fairness is judged 
exclusively by the outcomes received in relation to the inputs. 
Fairness perceptions are primarily constructed by examining the 
distribution of outcomes.
While the contribution of equity theory to the understanding of 
fairness cannot be underestimated, Folger (1986) points out that the 
theory is incomplete. Equity theory does not consider the procedures 
involved as determinants of perceptions of fairness. Equity theory, 
therefore, cannot account for recent findings in the field of 
procedural justice.
The work of Thibaut and Walker (1975) has greatly expanded 
understanding of fairness in relation to dispute resolution. They 
researched fairness perceptions as they relate to dispute resolution 
in the court of law. In addition to the outcome of the decision made 
regarding the dispute, Walker, LaTour, Lind, and Thibaut (1974) 
found that variations in procedures affected the perceptions of 
fairness. By controlling the inputs and outcomes of adjudication 
procedures, Walker et al. examined the independent effects of two 
different procedures on the subjects’ perceptions of fairness. They 
found that subjects rated the fairness of the outcome more highly if 
an adversarial procedure was used rather than an inquisitorial 
procedure. The study found support for the equity theory as defined 
by Adams (1965); as the subjects' outcomes were increased, their 
ratings of fairness increased. The more striking finding was the 
independent increase in perceived fairness due solely to the 
differences in procedures. Subjects clearly evaluated their outcomes 
with reference to the procedure used to derive the outcomes. The 
linking of justice perceptions to procedures sparked research
3interests in procedural justice effects separate from distributive 
justice effects.
Fair process effect. As equity theory focuses on inputs and 
outputs exclusively, it lacks explanatory power for one of the most 
robust findings in the study of procedural justice, which has come to 
be known as the "fair process effect" (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & 
Corkran, 1979). Succinctly, the fair process effect refers to the 
phenomenon of people feeling more satisfied with their input-to- 
outcome ratio when the procedure for deciding the outcomes is 
perceived as fair. Given the same inputs and outputs, people feel 
less satisfied with the outcomes when the procedure is perceived as 
less fair. People are also more satisfied with negative outcomes if 
the procedure used to decide the dispute was perceived as fair.
Cushion of support. The importance of the procedure used in
resolving disputes is illustrated by what has been termed the
"cushion of support" (Lind & Tyler, 1988). In general, the cushion of 
support refers to the positive effects of fair procedures. In an 
extensive review of the procedural justice literature, Lind and Tyler 
(1988) have outlined six major areas in which research has 
documented the effect of procedural justice. Procedural justice has 
been shown to increase (1) ratings of performance of legal 
institutions and authorities (Tyler, 1984, 1987); (2) evaluations of 
legal decisions and outcomes (LaTour, 1978; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, 
Walker, & Thibaut, 1980); (3) satisfaction with encounters with the
legal system (Adler, Hensler, & Nelson, 1983; Tyler, 1986); (4)
4perceptions of legitimacy; (5) support for legal institutions; and (6) 
compliance with laws and judgments (Friedland, Thibaut & Walker, 
1973). Given fair procedures, a cushion of support is created for the 
decision maker and the institution supporting the decision.
Recipients of the decision are more accepting of the decision in 
general and more accepting of the institution and decision maker if 
the decision was made through the use of fair procedures. Of 
particular interest is the effect of fair procedures when the outcome 
is negative. It is in delivering a negative outcome to a participant in 
a dispute that a decision maker and institution are in need of a 
"cushion of support" from any ill feelings the participant may have.
C ontrol. Provided that different procedures influence 
perceptions of procedural justice, and that positive effects regarding 
the decision maker are realized by fair procedures, the next step was 
to examine what makes a fair procedure fair. LaTour, Houlden, 
Walker and Thibaut (1976) found that subjects rated different 
procedures as more or less fair depending on the amount of control 
vested in the third party as compared to the amount of control 
retained by the participants.
Control over the procedures has become a focal point in the 
study of procedural fairness. Two types of control have been 
distinguished in the literature (Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 
1978; Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978). The first type of control, 
decision control, refers to the participants' control over the decision 
being made. A bargaining procedure would be an example in which
all of the decision control is retained by the disputants because a 
third party is not brought into the dispute resolution procedure. At
the other end of the continuum presented by LaTour et at. is the 
autocratic adjudication procedure, which may place complete control
over the decision in the hands of a third party.
The second type of control, process control, refers not to direct 
control over the decision being made, but to the participants' control 
over the presentation of evidence and arguments related to their 
cases. Thibaut and Walker (1975) explain that procedures are rated 
as more fair if the participants have more opportunity to provide the 
decision maker with the evidence relevant to their cases. Fair 
representation of the concerns of each disputant results in high 
process control for each disputant. By presenting their views and 
arguments concerning the case, the disputants control the 
information which is used in the resolution of the dispute.
Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden (1974) defined five 
different dispute resolution procedures which vary in the amount of 
process control and decision control afforded to the disputants. The
five procedures are as follows:
1. Bargaining Consensus without a third party. Outcomes are 
limited to all or nothing.
2. Inquisitorial Adjudication in which the third party 
investigates the dispute and renders judgment.
63. Single investigator Adjudication that includes a single 
investigator serving to collect information from the 
disputing parties for the adjudicator.
4. Double investigator Adjudication that includes an 
investigator assigned by the adjudicator to each of the 
disputants. The investigator serves to collect information 
from the disputants and relay the information to the 
adjudicator
5. Adversary A binding third party decision procedure. Each 
disputant selects a representative to collect and present 
information relevant to his/her case.
Thibaut et al. (1974) found that the most preferred procedure 
was the adversary procedure, and the least preferred was the 
bargaining procedure.
In a later study, Lind, Erickson, Friedland, & Dickenberger 
(1978) found that the preferences for procedures were rank ordered 
based on the amount of control the third-party is given. The 
adversary procedure was rated as investing nearly the right amount 
of control in the third-party. Following consecutively, the double 
investigator, single investigator, and inquisitorial procedures were all 
rated as investing too much control in the third party. The Lind et al. 
study investigated judgments of fairness across cultures to assess the 
possibilities of cultural bias. The results show very strong support 
for the idea that subjects prefer procedures in which they retain
7control over the process leading to the outcome. Regardless of the 
type of court system commonly used in the targeted countries, the 
subjects preferred the adversarial system because it provided them 
with the desired level of process control.
V oice
As the procedural justice research has focused on the formal 
procedures of dispute resolution, the term "voice" has been used to 
represent process control. The original conception of the term "voice" 
comes from Hirschman (1970). In Hirschman's original conception of 
voice, the term refers to an attempt to influence a process by means 
of expressing one's views regarding the issue. The context in which 
he describes voice is in relation to consumer behavior. Voice is 
described as an option available to people when they are unsatisfied 
with an economic exchange and wish to alter the outcome of the 
exchange to a more favorable distribution.
A second option available to persons receiving an 
unsatisfactory allocation or outcome is to "exit". In Hirshman's 
original conception of exit, the term refers to the departure of the 
person from the procedure. Rather than attempting to influence the 
procedures in order to adjust the outcomes (voice), the exit option is 
used to disassociate the person from the situation by leaving the 
procedure. In the context of consumer behavior, exit refers to a 
consumer discontinuing business with a particular company 
pertaining to the disputed issue.
8While exit has not been included in models of procedural 
justice, voice has been studied to a great extent and has been shown 
to be a very important factor influencing perceptions of procedural 
fairness. Through the use of voice, disputants attempt to obtain the 
level of process control desired, which increases the ratings of 
perceived procedural fairness. Procedures allowing voice have been 
shown to be perceived as more fair than similar procedures without 
voice (LaTour, 1978; Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Lind et al., 1980; Walker 
et al., 1974). The effect of voice is a fundamental element in the 
recent procedural justice research.
Instrumental vo ice. The definition of voice as process control 
has an important theoretical assumption regarding the use of voice. 
The assumption made is that attaining the outcome under dispute is 
the motivating element for the use of voice as process control. 
Through process control, people are able to better assure that 
equitable outcomes will be obtained (Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Brett 
& Golberg, 1983). Tyler, Rasinski, and Spodick (1985) describe this 
use of voice as a rational perspective on voice. Accordingly, the 
value of voice is linked exclusively to the amount of decision control 
derived from control over the procedures enacted to decide the 
dispute. The rational perspective depicts voice as an instrumental 
attempt to obtain the desired outcomes.
Lind and Tyler (1988) have reviewed the procedural justice 
literature to date. They have presented a self interest model to 
account for the findings that voice raises ratings of perceived
9procedural justice due to its instrumental use in increasing the 
probability of equitable outcomes. The work of Thibaut and Walker 
(1978) is rooted in the assumption that people are interested in 
obtaining their desired outcome. Leventhal's (1976) theory of 
procedural justice is also built upon what Lind and Tyler call self 
in terest.
Accordingly, people participate in groups in order to benefit 
their individual interests. People will remain in the group as long as 
they believe that the group will provide greater outcomes in the long 
run than could be obtained outside of the group. Fair procedures 
assure that the group will provide future benefits for the individual. 
In conflict with other members of the group, individual members 
will forgo desired outcomes provided that fair procedures are used.
If procedures are not perceived as fair, group members have no 
assurance of future self interest benefits, and will be more likely to 
depart from the group, thereby threatening the group's functioning, 
if not it’s existence.
An important aspect of the self interest model and the 
evidence supporting it is that, ultimately, people desire decision 
control which raises the probability that their desired outcomes will 
be realized. Complete, individual decision control would be 
destructive for the group, however, so people will give up decision 
control in order to maintain the group. Process control is viewed as a 
way of gaining decision control. By retaining a significant amount of 
process control, participants are able to affect the decision without
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disrupting the group. Again, process control is an instrumental 
attempt to gain the desired outcomes.
It follows that voice is considered an instrumental attempt by 
the participant to increase his/her amount of decision control. In 
both the self interest model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the rational 
perspective of voice (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985), it is predicted 
that voice which does not provide decision control will not be 
desirable to subjects. The fair process effect should not be present 
when voice does not provide any influence over the outcome through 
process control. Tyler et al., (1985) point out that feelings of 
injustice and dissatisfaction may actually increase when voice is 
allowed but does not provide any decision control.
Evidence supporting this instrumental view of voice can be 
found in the "frustration effect” (Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, 
Grove & Corkran, 1979). Contrary to the fair process effect resulting 
from procedures in which voice opportunity is provided, subjects 
who had voice opportunity without process control rated the 
procedure as less fair. The frustration effect can be explained with 
reference to the use of voice. Subjects given voice which does not 
seem to them to be instrumental in the acquisition of their desired 
outcomes may view the procedure as a "sham” rather than actual 
process control. It may be the dissociation of process control from 
decision control that accounts for the frustration effect.
Value expressive voice. The self interest model of voice cannot 
account for all of the findings in the procedural justice field,
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however. Tyler et al. (1985) found that increased process control did 
in fact increase ratings of procedural justice, even when process 
control was linked with low decision control. The fair process effect 
was observed to the same degree with subjects who were given low 
decision control as it was with subjects who were given high decision 
control. This finding led the researchers to conclude that voice has a 
value separate from the instrumental value presented under the 
rational perspective. There is a component of voice that increases 
perceptions of fairness, yet is not associated with decision control or 
altering the distributions of outcomes. These findings contradict the 
underlying assumption of the self interest model.
Musante, Gilbert, and Thibaut (1983) conducted a study which 
also showed that the fair process effect occurs when process control 
is not associated with decision control. The most interesting finding 
of Musante et al. for the present study is that subjects rated the 
procedures and the decision more fair if they were given a chance to 
express their views regardless of whether or not those views would 
effect the decision. The Musante et al. study seems to be the clearest 
example that voice has an expressive component aside from any 
instrumental value. The expressive value of voice has been termed 
the value expressive component of voice (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 
1985).
To account for the value expressive component of voice, Lind 
and Tyler (1988) present a model separate from the self interest 
model called the group value model. In contrast to the self interest
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model, the group value model proposes that voice has a value in 
addition to it's instrumental value. As the basis of the model Lind 
and Tyler suggest that people have a strong social orientation toward 
groups. Voice can be shown to have a value in preserving or 
identifying membership in the group. The expression of one’s views 
and the consideration of those views is a representation of the 
person's value to the group, and acceptance in the group. The value 
expressive component of voice represents the desire to have one’s 
views voiced and considered. In the group value model, increases in 
procedural justice ratings can be explained with reference to the 
value expressive component of voice. It is the contention of Lind and 
Tyler that people are interested in the outcome of the decision, but 
they also have a separate interest in being involved in the process by 
which the decision is made. The group value model can predict a fair 
process effect for people who have voice yet do not have decision 
control.
Interactional Fairness
Bies and Moag (1986) present a model of procedural justice 
which may further develop explanations of the value of voice. By 
focusing on the interaction between the decision-maker and the 
participant at the time the procedures are enacted, Bies and Moag 
have found that the interaction may affect perceptions of procedural 
justice. They present a new model of procedural justice that does not 
contradict past research, hnt adds concern for the interaction that 
takes place during the enactment of the procedure. Accordingly, the
model 'predicts that perceptions of procedural justice may be affected 
by any of three different parts of a dispute resolution. First, equity 
theory (Adams, 1965) focused on the outcome and the effect of the 
outcome on perceptions of procedural justice. Secondly, Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) focused on the procedure of dispute resolution and 
found it to have an independent effect on perception of fairness in 
dispute resolutions. Finally, Bies and Moag (1986) have shown that 
the interaction between the decision-maker and the participants is a 
third source of information used in formulating perceptions of 
procedural justice. Tyler and Bies (1988) contend that perceptions of 
fairness are socially constructed from information about the 
procedure, the interaction, and the outcome.
The conduct of the decision-maker is the focus of interactional 
fairness presented by Bies and Moag (1986). In particular, they 
present two aspects of the decision-maker's conduct which are 
salient to people when their perceptions of fairness are constructed. 
The first aspect is the interpersonal treatment of the person involved 
in the dispute. The second aspect is whether the decision maker 
enacted the formal procedures properly.
Tyler and Bies (1988) outline five norms with respect to the 
proper enactment of formal procedures by the decision maker. They 
are listed below for purposes of theoretical completion only, because 
the focus of the present study with regards to interactional fairness 
is interpersonal treatment. Proper enactment of procedures include 
the following: adequately considering employees' viewpoints,
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suppressing personal biases, applying decision-making criteria 
consistently across employees, providing timely feedback to 
employees after a decision, and providing an explanation for the 
decision (an account of the decision).
Interpersonal treatment was examined by Bies (1987a) in a 
study which looked at the fairness judgments by MBA students with 
regard to corporate recruiting procedures. The following aspects of 
interpersonal treatment were found to be important: honesty, 
courteous treatment, timely feedback, and respect for their rights 
with regard to the types of questions that were asked.
Tyler (1988) conducted a study which focused on the 
interaction of citizens with the police and the court system. The 
study revealed that perceptions of fairness were affected by 
interpersonal treatment. The results suggest that people are 
interested in interpersonal treatment in addition to the formal 
procedures. Of particular interest for the present study is the finding 
that two variables had independent effects on perceptions of
procedural justice: honesty and ethical appropriateness (politeness
*
and respect for rights). Tyler and Folger (1980) found that citizen 
satisfaction with police performance was tied to the interaction 
between the police and the citizens. The citizens expected the police 
to conform to the ethical norms of interaction concerning a public 
servant. They also expected the police to be courteous in their 
interactions with the public.
In 1980, Leaventhal proposed six rules that have been 
instrumental in the theoretical development of procedural justice 
research. Although interactional fairness has been overlooked in the 
procedural justice literature, Leaventhal's rules make reference to 
possible effects outside of the formal procedures and the outcomes.
The rules are described as follows:
1. Consistency rule-- allocating procedures should be applied 
consistently across people and time;
2. Bias Suppression rule— personal self interest and blind
allegiance to narrow preconceptions should be prevented;
3. Accuracy rule— decisions must be based on as much good 
information and informed opinion as possible;
4. Correctabilitv rule— Opportunities must exist to modify and 
reverse decisions;
5. Representativeness rule-- the allocation process must 
represent the concerns of all important subgroups and 
individuals;
6. Ethicalitv rule— the allocation process must be compatible 
with prevailing moral and ethical standards.
The ethicality rule is important to the current discussion as it 
subsumes the interactional fairness factor in procedural justice. The 
procedural justice model developed by Thibaut and Walker (1975), 
which has guided the procedural justice research to date, is 
subsumed under the representativeness rule. While the model
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presented by Thibaut and Walker has been very valuable, and 
certainly a pivotal point in the procedural justice research, Tyler and 
Bies (1988) suggest that it is far too limiting because it does not 
consider the conduct of the decision-maker. Given the fact that there 
is an interaction involved in every dispute resolution, the finding 
that interactional fairness is an important consideration for people 
evaluating a procedure suggests that interaction should be included 
in the theoretical framework of procedural justice.
Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) investigated the six rules 
developed by Leaventhal and found that the ethicality rule was the 
second most important rule in ratings of procedural justice. The 
striking finding about their results is the range of situations used in 
the study, and the frequency with which the ethicality rule was 
deemed important. The ethicality rule was found to be important by 
the subjects across sixteen different conditions. The study lends 
strong support to the need to recognize interactional fairness in the 
theory of procedural justice.
Content of Voice
With the addition of interpersonal interaction to the theoretical 
model of procedural justice presented by Thibaut and Walker (1975), 
a fresh look at the concept of voice is warranted. Due to the nature 
of the procedural justice research, voice has been assumed to be an 
attempt to influence the procedures by stating one's case or adding 
pertinent information for the decision-maker to consider. Voice has 
been defined as a form of process control (Lind & Tyler, 1988).
1 T
Viewing voice as simply a method of process control is consistent 
with research inspired by the Thibaut and Walker model. Since the 
model focuses on the formal procedures and not on the effects of 
personal interactions during the procedure, it would follow that the 
concept of voice would not include the effects of personal 
interactions. Tyler and Bies (1988) contend that the lack of regard 
for personal interaction during the enactment of the procedure is a 
serious limitation of the Thibaut and Walker procedural justice 
model. It is the contention of the present author that the 
conceptualization of voice as purely a form of process control is an 
inadequate conceptualization because it regards only the formal 
procedure without reference to the personal interaction during the 
procedure.
With separate effects of instrumental and value expressive 
uses of voice, it is reasonable to expect differences in the content of 
that voice. The present study investigated different voice contents 
under different conditions. The content of voice was examined in 
conditions designed to produce perceptions of high and low 
interactional fairness and in conditions designed to produce high and 
low perceptions of the instrumental value of voice. Low interactional 
fairness indicated exclusion from the group or process, while low 
instrumentality of voice indicated the voice opportunity would not 
be effective in raising outcomes. In effect, the low conditions 
indicated subjects did not have process control and they were not 
accepted as legitimate members of the group associated with the
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process. It was expected, therefore, that the content of voice in low 
conditions would be different than in high conditions, where high 
instrumentality indicated that subjects have process control, and 
high interactional fairness indicated that they were legitimate 
members of the group associated with the process. More expressed 
values were exected to be observed in the Comment Forms of 
subjects in low conditions as those subjects tended to psychologically 
depart from the process. Variations in perceptions of procedural 
justice should support the findings of Bies (1987b) that interactional 
fairness is an important element used in the construction of 
perceptions of fairness.
As process control, the content of voice should reflect an 
instrumental attempt to influence the process resulting in higher 
probability of receiving the desired outcome. Voice used for that 
purpose was termed "instrumental voice" (criterion for instrumental 
voice can be found in Appendix A.). A second type of voice, also 
defined by the content of the voice, should reflect a departure from 
the instrumental use of voice. Rather than an attempt to influence 
the process and obtain outcomes, voice may be used for value 
expressive reasons (Tyler, 1987). Subjects using the second type of 
voice, termed "expressive voice" (see Appendix A.) should state 
concerns about the procedure, decision-maker, organization or 
injustice in the form of expressed values or feelings. Expressive 
components of voice do not attempt to directly influence the outcome 
or decision being made. Rather than using voice as a form of process
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control, the users of expressive voice use voice as an opportunity to 
express their views concerning various aspects of the procedure or 
issue. The rational attempt to influence outcomes of the dispute by 
means of process control should be replaced by an expression of 
opinions and views about the dispute. The expressive voice 
represents non-acceptance of the current procedure because the use 
of expressive voice replaces the instrumental value of voice as 
process control. In effect, expressive voice may represent a 
psychological "exit” from the procedures parallel to "exit" as 
conceptualized by Hirshman (1970). Expressive voice was expected 
to increase when perceptions of procedural justice were low.
By manipulating the perceived instrumentality of voice and the 
interactional fairness involved in the procedure, it should be possible 
to examine the content of voice and perceptions of fairness in 
situations where expressive voice may be used rather than 
instrumental voice. If interactional fairness is held constant at a 
socially appropriate level (high interactional fairness), instrumental 
voice is expected to prevail in conditions of perceived high 
instrumentality. In line with the fair process effect, the perceived 
procedural justice should be quite high in that condition because a 
voice opportunity is an established part of the procedure.
If the perceived instrumentality of voice is low, we may also 
see a predominance of instrumental voice used, provided that an 
appropriate level of interactional fairness is achieved through 
interpersonal treatment. The group value model presented by Lind
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and Tyler (1988) suggests that as the identity of the participant as a 
member of the group is respected, positive effects of voice will be 
seen in perceptions of procedural justice. As an accepted member of 
the group, perceptions of procedural justice increase. Interactional 
fairness should serve to increase the status and acceptance of the 
participant in the group. The interactional fairness of the procedure 
should serve to retain the person's acceptance of the process, 
resulting in a high use of instrumental voice.
Empirical evidence for this can be found in the results of a 
study by Musante et al. (1983) where voice raised perceptions of 
procedural justice even when there was clearly no perceived 
instrumentality of voice. Without instrumentality, voice still shows 
positive effects on perceptions of procedural justice.
According to the rational perspective of voice (Tyler, Rasinski,
& Spodick, 1985), and according to the self interest model presented 
by Lind and Tyler (1988), the instrumentality of voice should be of 
greatest concern for the subjects. In a condition where subjects 
perceive a high level of instrumentality of voice, they should be less 
concerned with interactional fairness information when constructing 
their judgments of procedural justice because high instrumentality of 
voice indicates a high level of process control for subjects. As 
process control is linked with decision control through high 
instrumentality of voice, the fair process effect should be evident. It 
was expected that subjects would show a predominant use of 
instrumental voice in the condition where they perceived a high
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level of instrumentality, even when the interactional fairness was 
perceived as low.
In the case where the perceived instrumentality of voice is low 
and^the interactional fairness in the procedure is perceived as low, 
however, a lower evaluation of procedural justice should be 
observed. Without perceived instrumentality, subjects may be more 
influenced by the interactional fairness than in a condition where 
there is perceived high instrumentality. If interactional fairness is 
low, and perceived instrumentality is low, perceptions of procedural 
justice should fall dramatically. The effect may be similar to the 
"frustration effect" found by Folger (1977). As subjects use the 
interaction to construct their perceptions of procedural justice, they 
may use the low interactional fairness as a sign that the opportunity 
for voice is a "sham". The use of an expressive form of voice should 
be the result, as the subjects psychologically depart from the 
procedure.
Expected Results
The hypotheses for the present study followed from the 
preceding theoretical discussion. The first prediction is that the 
content of voice will vary due to the conditions that precede the 
voice. Two different forms of voice were expected to be found under 
different conditions. They have been described previously as 
instrumental voice and expressive voice.
Theoretically the relationship between instrumental and 
expressive voice is expected to be continuous and bipolar. In the
present study, separate predictions were made concerning the use of 
instrumental voice and expressive voice. Voice was measured as two 
separate dependent variables, allowing for the possibility that it is 
not a bipolar variable. Inspected together, however, the predictions 
about each of the voice dependent variables suggest that 
instrumental and expressive are negatively correlated, bipolar uses 
of voice.
Instrumental vo ice . Main effects of instrumentality and 
interactional fairness were expected. Conditions high in 
instrumentality were expected to result in higher usage of 
instrumental voice. Conditions high in interactional fairness were 
also expected to result in higher usage of instrumental voice.
Expressive voice. Main effects of instrumentality and 
interactional fairness were expected. Conditions high in 
instrumentality were expected to result in lower usage of expressive 
voice. Conditions high in interactional fairness were also expected to 
result in lower usage of expressive voice.
Procedural justice. Main effects of instrumentality and 
interactional fairness were expected. Subjects in conditions high in 
interactional fairness were expected to rate procedural justice as 
higher than subjects in conditions low in interactional fairness. 
Subjects in high instrumentality conditions were expected to rate 






One hundred and four undergraduate students from a 
Midwestern university participated in the study and received extra
credit points for their participation. Thirty males and 74 females 
served as subjects in the study, with 26 subjects randomly assigned 
to each condition.
Subjects participated in the experiment as individuals, although
multiple subjects were run simultaneously in partial isolation. This 
was accomplished by using a large auditorium room allowing 
sufficient space between subjects to eliminate interaction. 
Additionally, each individual subject viewed the performance 
appraisal feedback session from his/her individual monitor.
The experimenter was blind to the instrumentality condition
due to the use of unidentifiable instrumentality manipulations. 
Subjects received a packet of information containing the 
manipulation, which was identified by the experimenter after the 
experiment. While some subjects in a particular session received the 
high instrumentality manipulation, others in the same session
received the low instrumentality manipulation. The experimenter 
was aware of the interactional fairness condition of each session as it 




A 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design was used to 
investigate the effects of interactional fairness and instrumentality 
on the content of voice and on perceptions of procedural justice. Data 
were analyzed using analysis of variance. Upon entering the lab, 
subjects were given an informed consent form to complete, which 
can be found in Appendix B. A brief introduction followed to inform 
subjects about the proceedings of the experiment.
Subjects were told they were participating in a study about the 
performance appraisal system within a particular company that 
specializes in package delivery. In particular they were told that the 
information they were to be given involved the package sorting 
position at the company. In order to gain impact, subjects were told 
that the information they read and saw was actual information taken 
from the company files. In actuality, the materials were developed 
by the experimenter in close replication of a package sorting job in a 
real company. In order to get the subjects involved in the 
experiment, it was conducted in a role-playing style. Subjects were 
instructed to view themselves as employees of the company as they 
vicariously experienced the performance appraisal process.
The performance appraisal scenario was developed with 
concerns of ecological validity. According to Bern and Lord (1979), 
"the concept of ecological validity requires that the relationships 
between situational variables and the behavior in the setting 
replicate the relationships between situational variables and the
behavior outside the laboratory." Although shortened in time, the 
scenario was designed to generally replicate an actual performance 
appraisal system and was presented as an actual performance 
appraisal system to the subjects.
Subjects received a packet of information to read at the onset 
of the experiment (see Appendix B.). The information was designed 
to provide the subjects with the sense of actually being an employee 
at the company, as subjects were expected to role-play when filling 
out the Comment Form. They received the following pieces of 
information: (a) general information about the delivery company; (b)
a description of the performance appraisal system taken from the 
company policy book; (c) objective descriptions of their prior 
performance; and (d) results from a previous employee attitude 
su rvey .
A performance appraisal feedback session was represented in 
the experimental conditions. Subjects read information pertaining to 
the performance appraisal system and their performance as 
employees in the company prior to watching a videotape of an 
"actual" performance appraisal feedback session of an employee. The 
information was designed to provide each subject with a clear 
understanding of his/her performance in order to evaluate the 
performance evaluation given to him/her through the videotape. 
Watching the videotape, all subjects witnessed a negative outcome of 
the performance appraisal. They were presented with a rating which 
was too low to qualify them for a standard merit raise. The outcome
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was contrary to evidence presented earlier to the subjects indicating 
that their performance was actually substantially higher. The 
performance rating was designed to be perceived by the subjects as 
an injustice. After being given role-playing instructions, subjects 
were expected to react to the injustice as if it had happened to them.
The performance appraisal system included a formal 
opportunity to voice. As part of the performance evaluation process, 
subjects were asked to complete a Comment Form after watching the 
performance evaluation feedback session. After it was completed, 
the Comment Form was to be attached to a performance evaluation 
form completed by the immediate supervisor in the videotape. In 
order to complete the scenario, the subjects placed both forms in an 
envelope to be sent to the area supervisor for evaluation. The final 
evaluation was to be made by the area supervisor from information 
on the performance evaluation and the Comment Form. In order to 
assure that every subject voiced realistically, the process was 
designed so the Comment Form was a necessary part of the system. 
This also ensured that subjects perceived the Comment Form as a 
voice opportunity within the evaluation process, rather than an 
appeal delivered after the evaluation process. It was also made clear 
to the subjects that their responses on the Comment Form were 
strictly confidential, and that the comments would not be read by 
their immediate supervisors. The detail of the Comment Form was 
intentionally left ambiguous in order to free subjects from
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restrictions of voice. Only general guidelines were presented for the 
completion of the form (see Appendix B.).
Manipulations
Instrumentality. Perceived instrumentality of voice was 
manipulated through the use of social information provided in the 
form of an employee attitude survey. Subjects were told that a 
survey of employee attitudes was conducted at the company several 
months prior to the experiment, which included a section pertaining 
to the performance appraisal system. All subjects were asked to 
read each question in the performance appraisal section, which 
consisted of two parts. The first part displayed the responses of a 
"typical employee" responding to the set of survey questions. Two 
questions in the set related directly to the instrumentality of voice in 
the interview process, while the remainder were general filler 
questions. In conditions of low instrumentality, responses to the 
survey questions regarding the Comment Form were negative, 
showing that the typical package sorter believed the Comment Form 
not to be effective in changing the evaluation given by the 
immediate supervisor. In conditions of high instrumentality, 
subjects read positive responses to the instrumentality questions 
showing that the typical package sorter believed the Comment Form 
was useful in changing evaluation scores. The second part of the 
survey results was a summary page describing the general findings 
of the survey. Included in the findings was a statement regarding
28
employees’ perceptions of the instrumentality of voice. The 
statement varied with conditions of high and low instrumentality.
Interactional fairness. A videotape was used to administer the 
interactional fairness manipulation. The tape presented a realistic, 
staged performance appraisal feedback session between a supervisor 
and a package sorter. The scene took place in an office, with only the 
supervisor and an employee present. It was a brief discussion about 
the evaluation rating given to the employee. The rating of the 
employee was below average, resulting in the employee not 
receiving a merit raise.
High interactional fairness was achieved by creating high 
interpersonal treatment as described by Tyler and Bies (1988). 
Respect and truthfulness were evident by the supervisors actions 
and script. Eye contact, use of the employee’s name, offering of a 
seat, and attention in listening were portrayed by the supervisor. A 
polite tone of voice, was used as well as professionally courteous 
speech. The supervisor appeared truthful when making statements 
about data collection and the results of the evaluation.
In the low interactional fairness condition the supervisor 
illustrated poor interpersonal treatment. The supervisor did not use 
the employee's name or offer the employee a seat. He used very 
little eye contact, and did not appear to be attentive when the 
employee spoke. The supervisor did not appear to be professionally 
courteous, and did not have a pleasant tone of voice. The supervisor
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appeared a bit hurried and made comments which were not 
convincingly truthful.
After viewing the videotaped performance evaluation, subjects 
were given the Comment Form to fill out in response to the 
information presented to them about the performance appraisal. The
Comment Form was later analyzed for the type of voice used, as 
defined by the content of the comments made. The design of the 
Comment Form was intentionally simplistic. It consisted of very 
brief instructions, followed by blank space in order for subjects to 
voice in whatever fashion and at whatever length they desired.
The content of each Comment Form was analyzed using rating 
scales. Each Comment Form was rated for instrumentality and 
expression. A 5-point scale was used to assess instrumental voice 
and a 4-point scale was used to assess expressive voice (rating scale 
criteria can be found in Appendix A). In order to test the 
hypotheses, cell means were compared using analysis of variance. In 
order to investigate the nature of the relationship between 
instrumental and expressive voice, a correlation between subjects' 
expressive scores and instrumental scores was used.
After all data were collected, the experimenter inspected the 
Comment Forms in order to derive exemplars of instrumental and 
expressive voice. Due to a data sheet coding scheme the 
experimenter was blind to conditions while examining the Comment 
Forms. Given the exploratory nature of the research, realistic 
examples of the theoretical classifications of voice had not been
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previously developed. The present experiment was designed to elicit 
the type of voice theorized, and to refine the definitions of each.
Rating of each Comment Form was done by two independent, 
trained assessors. They were trained, and given exemplars to use as 
benchmarks in rating the forms. The assessors independently rated 
each Comment Form for instrumentality, and then came to consensus 
on the rating if they differed in their initial ratings. They then rated 
each Comment Form for expressiveness using the same procedure.
Pilot testing was conducted in order to assess the feasibility of 
the performance appraisal scenario. Other concerns addressed in the 
pilot testing stage were the effectiveness of the independent 
variables, the believability of the experimental situation, and the 
presence of two different types of voice. Pilot data were used to aid 
in deriving exemplars of voice types.
Upon completion of the Comment Form, subjects were informed 
that the experiment had ended, and were instructed to fill out a 
questionnaire about the experiment. The questionnaire included 
manipulation checks for each of the independent variables, 
explanatory questions, demographics, and dependent variables. The 
questionnaire used in the experiment can be found in Appendix C.
Subjects were debriefed and an explanation of the research 
was presented. After being asked not to discuss the experiment with 





Data were collected from two sources: the Comment Forms 
filled out by each subject and the responses given on the post- 
experiment questionnaire. Analysis of variance was used for 
statistical analysis of each source of data. Individual subjects were 
used as the unit of analysis. A copy of the questionnaire used in the 
experiment can be found in Appendix C.
Manipulation Checks
Interactional fairness. Perceptions of interactional fairness 
were assessed by two questions on the questionnaire; (#2) "To what 
extent was your supervisor courteous and polite to you?", and (#6) 
"Did you feel that you as the employee were given fair interpersonal 
treatment in the videotape?" Responses to each question were 
measured using 9-point rating scales. The two questions were found 
to be correlated at r = .70. The composite score of the two 
interactional fairness questions was used as the interactional fairness 
manipulation check, and a MANOVA procedure was done to test for 
the effectiveness of the manipulation. The composite for 
interactional fairness was significant (F(2,99)= 107.42, p.<.001). The 
interaction of interactional fairness and instrumentality was not 
statistically significant (F= 1.15).
Additionally, separate analyses on the two questions showed a 
main effect of interactional fairness for each of the questions. Table
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1 shows the ANOVA results for question #2, while Table 2 shows the 
results for question #6. Interactional fairness perceptions were 
rated higher in question #2 by subjects in the high interactional 
fairness condition ( M -1.29)  than subjects in the low interactional 
fairness conditions (M =2.70). Responses to question #6 were similar. 
Subjects in conditions high in interactional fairness rated 
interactional fairness higher (M -5.62) than subjects in conditions low 
in interactional fairness (M =2.731. Accordingly, it can be confidently 
stated that subjects were affected by the experimental manipulation 
of interactional fairness.
Instrumentality. Instrumentality was assessed also by two 
questions on the post-experimental questionnaire. Question #1 
("How useful did you perceive the Comment Form to be for 
increasing your performance ratings?"), and question #10 ("Did you 
feel your ratings could be raised by the area supervisor after he read 
your Comment Form?") were used as a composite to measure 
subjects' perceptions of the instrumentality of voice. They were 
found to be correlated at r = .44. The composite for instrumentality 
was statistically significant (F(2,99)= 13.16) using a MANOVA test. 
The interaction of interactional fairness and instrumentality was 
nonsignificant (F(2,99)=2.02).
Separate analyses of each question were performed in order to 
investigate the quality of the questionnaire items. Results for 
question 1 can be found in Table 3, and results for question 10 can 
be found in Table 4. In question #1 instrumentality of voice was
Table 1
ANOVA: ("Question 2)  Interactional Fairness Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)
Source of Variation Sum of d_f Mean F
Squares Square
Total 816..99 103 7.93
Explained 563..87 3 187 .96
IF 549,.24 1 5 4 9 .2 4 216.99**
I 14,.62 1 14.62 5.78*
IF x I .01 1 .01 .00




ANOVA: ('Question 6) Interactional Fairness Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (TF) and Instrumentality (D





Total 6 3 6 .8 9 103 6 .183
Explained 231 .43 3 77 .1 4 3
IF 216 .35 1 216 .35 53.36**
I 7 .54 1 7 .54 1.86
IF x I 7 .54 1 7 .54 1.86




ANOVA: (Question I s) Perceived Instrumentality Ratings as a
Function of Interactional Fairness (IF1 and Instrumentality (I)





Total 5 1 3 .6 5 103 4 .99
Explained 119.73 3 39.91
IF .35 1 .35 .09
I 104 1 1 04 26.4**
IF x I 15.38 1 15.38 3.91*
Residual 3 9 3 .9 2 100 3 .94
*p<.051 **p<.001.
Table 4
ANOVA: (Question 10") Perceived Instrumentality Ratings as a
Function of Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality fP





Total 6 3 1 .3 9 103 6.13
Explained 30 .3 9 3 10.13
IF 3 .12 1 3.12 .52
I 18 .62 1 18.62 3 .10
IF x I 8.65 1 8.65 1.44
Residual 601 100 6.01
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
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rated higher by subjects in conditions where they were given high 
instrumentality (M_=6.06) than in conditions of low instrumentality 
CM -4.06). The effect was significant at p<.001. Question #10, 
however, did not show the main effect of instrumentality it was 
expected to show. Subjects in conditions of high instrumentality 
tended to rate instrumentality higher (M =5.85) than subjects in 
conditions of low instrumentality (M =5.00). but the effect was not 
statistically significant at g<.05. A closer inspection of question #10 
indicates a slight ambiguity of interpretation as a possible 
explanation of the lack of convincing findings. Standard deviations in 
question #10 were substantially higher (high Instrumentality (I)., 
high Interactional Fairness (I.F.)=2.52; low I., high I.F.=2.57; high I., 
low I.F.=2.41; low I., low I.F.=2.34) than standard deviations in 
question #1 (high I., high I.F.=1.95; low I., high I.F.=1.90; high I., low 
I.F.= 1.84; low I., low I.F.=2.23) indicating confusion among subjects 
about the meaning of the question.
Given the highly significant instrumentality composite of 
questions it is clear that perceptions of the instrumentality of voice 
were successfully manipulated through the social cues placed in the 
informational packets read by subjects.
Confidentiality. An important aspect of the performance 
appraisal scenario is that voice is directed at a third party, thus 
freeing the employees from any fears of negative repercussions from 
their immediate supervisor, and freeing them from that limitation of 
voice. Care was taken in the design of the performance appraisal
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scenario to make sure the subjects understood their voice would be 
held confidential by the area supervisor. Manipulation checks were 
included in the questionnaire to assess subjects1 perceptions of the 
confidentiality of the voice Comment Forms. Question #8 "In this 
company, is the immediate supervisor permitted to read your 
comments on the Comment Form?" was answered in the negative by 
100 subjects and in the positive by 3 subjects (one subject failed to 
respond to the question). A second question related to
confidentiality is question #15 "How likely is it that your immediate
supervisor would ever see your comments on the Comment Form?". 
Responses were recorded using a 9-point rating scale, and an ANOVA 
showed that there were no significant differences between groups in 
perceptions of confidentiality (Table 5). The overall mean rating for
question #15 was 3.00 with a standard deviation of 2.397 where the
low range reflects the belief of confidentiality. Apparently, subjects 
did believe their comments written on the Comment Forms were not 
accessible to their immediate supervisors. They were free to voice to 
the decision maker in whatever manner they desired, without 
complications of an ongoing relationship with their immediate 
supervisor.
Voice Content
The content of voice was rated using the rating criteria found 
in Appendix A. Data presented in this section represent consensus 
ratings between two independent raters. Inter-rater reliability for
Table 5
ANOVA: Comment Form Confidentiality Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (TF) and Instrumentality (1)





Total 5 92 .01 103 5 .7 4 8
Explained 16.93 3 5 .64
IF 12.46 1 12.46 2.17
I 3.85 1 3.85 .67
IF x I .62 1 .62 .11
Residual 5 7 5 .0 8 100 5.75
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
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instrumental voice was .85, while inter-rater reliability for 
expressive voice was .72.
Instrumental voice. The results of an ANOVA on instrumental 
voice can be found in Table 6. No significant differences were found 
between the experimental conditions. Instrumental voice behavior 
was rated on a 5-point scale, which can be found in Appendix A. The 
distribution of instrumental voice ratings was as follows (rating; 
number of subjects): 1;9, 2;16, 3; 52, 4;15, 5;12.
Expressive voice. The results of an ANOVA on expressive voice 
can be found in Table 7. As in the case of instrumental voice, no 
significant differences were found between the experimental 
conditions. Expressive voice behavior was rated on a 4-point scale 
which can be found in Appendix A. The distribution of expressive 
voice ratings was as follows (rating; number of subjects): 1; 40, 2; 53, 
3; 7, 4; 4.
The results of the voice content measures are highly 
unexpected as they are contrary to the theoretical basis of this thesis. 
This issue is detailed in the discussion section.
Questionnaire Dependent Variables
Several questions were included in the post experimental 
questionnaire to investigate possible experimental effects, or 
alternative explanations of the data results. They also serve to 
assure the integrity of the experimental scenario.
Three-way analysis of variance tests were done to investigate 
possible subject gender effects and subject prior experience with
Table 6
ANOVA: Instrumental Voice Behavior Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness TIF) and Instrumentality (T)





Total 110.91 103 1.08
Explained 1.64 3 .55
IF 1.16 1 1.16 1.06
I .01 1 .01 .01
IF x I .47 1 .47 .43
Residual 109 .27 100 1.09
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
Table 7
ANOVA: Expressive Voice Behavior Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)





Total 57 103 .55
Explained .88 3 .29
IF .78 1 .78 1.39
I .01 1 .01 .02
IF x I .09 1 .09 .15
Residual 5 6 .1 2 100 .56
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
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performance appraisals. These issues were measured by question 
#18 and question #17 respectively (#18, Please indicate your sex;
#17, Have you ever had your performance rated on an actual job 
where you have worked?).
Results showed that neither responses to dependent variable 
questions nor behavioral voice dependent variables statistically 
differed as a function of subject gender or prior subject experience 
with performance appraisals. With respect to question #11, 
assessing the anger of subjects, a significant interaction was found 
between experience with performance appraisals and interactional 
fairness condition. A least significant differences test showed that 
subjects not having experience with performance appraisals were 
more angry in conditions where interactional fairness was low 
(M =6.79) than in conditions where interactional fairness was high 
CM=5.84). The effect was statistically significant (p.<.05), however a 
Scheffe test showed no differences between groups. Although very 
tentative, the result suggests that affective responses of subjects 
without experience in performance appraisal were more likely to be 
influenced by interactional fairness than affective responses of 
subjects who did have experience with performance appraisals.
Each of the dependent variables was also investigated for a 
possible experimenter effect as the experiment was administered by 
two different experimenters at different times (one male and one 
female experimenter). Three-way analysis of variance tests showed 
no main effect differences in any dependent variable responses
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between subjects who experienced a male experimenter and subjects 
who experienced a female experimenter.
There were two questions in which significant interactions 
were found, however. In question #10 (instrumentality), subjects 
who experienced a male experimenter rated instrumentality higher 
in conditions of low interactional fairness CM =1.13) than in conditions 
of high interactional fairness (M=4.75). The effect was significant 
(]1<.05) using the least significant differences test; however, a Scheffe 
test showed no significant differences between the groups. In 
respect to question #11 subjects were significantly (P<.05) less angry 
in conditions of high interactional fairness and a female 
experimenter fM =4.83) than conditions of high interactional fairness 
and a male experimenter CM=6.4). The effect was significant using 
the least significant differences test; however, a Scheffe test did not 
show the groups as significantly different.
The indications of an experimenter effect by the interactions 
described above are very tenative. It should be noted that only 20 
subjects in random conditions experienced the female experimenter, 
while 84 subjects experienced the male experimenter.
Further exploratory analysis investigated the effect of subjects’ 
subjective ability to identify with the employee in the performance
appraisal scenario. Table 8 shows the results of an analysis of
variance test on question #16 (To what extent were you able to
identify with the employee in the video in order to role play in the
performance appraisal process?). Subjects in different experimental
Table 8
ANOVA: Ratings of Identification With Employee as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (7)





Total 4 1 7 .7 6 103 4 .06
Explained 7.57 3 2 .5 2
IF .09 1 .09 .02
I 7.01 1 7.01 1.71
IF x I .47 1 .47 .11
Residual 4 1 0 .1 9 100 4 .10
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
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conditions did not differ statistically in their ability to identify with 
their roles as employees in the performance appraisal scenario, and 
subjects were able to identify with the employee in the video. On a 
9-point rating scale, with 9 indicating high identification with the 
employee and 1 indicating low identification with the employee, 
means ranged from 6.35 to 7.00
Procedural justice. Procedural justice perceptions were 
assessed with two 9-point scale items in the questionnaire: (#5) 
"Overall, do you feel the performance appraisal process (Comment 
Form, supervisor ratings, etc.) was fair?"; and (#7) How much do you 
feel the entire performance appraisal system (Comment Form, 
supervisor ratings, etc.) results in fair performance evaluations for 
employees?". MANOVA on the two questions as a composite 
produced an F of 14.11 with 2 and 99 degrees of freedom for 
instrumentality, which was significant at j3<.001. Subjects in 
conditions of high instrumentality rated procedural justice higher 
(M=5.00) than subjects in conditions of low instrumentality (M = 3 .85). 
An F of 2.37 with 2 and 99 degrees of freedom for interactional 
fairness was significant at n<.10. Subjects in conditions of high 
interactional fairness tended to rate procedural justice higher 
fM =4.76) than subjects in conditions of low interactional fairness 
(M =4.08). The interaction of instrumentality and interactional 
fairness produced an F of 1.16 with 2 and 99 df, which was not 
statistically significant.
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A separate ANOVA procedure was used to assess each of the 
two procedural justice questions. Table 9 displays the results of the 
ANOVA on question #5, while Table 10 displays the results of 
question #7. This further analysis was done in order to investigate 
each question independently. The analysis revealed that question #5 
seems to be measuring a slightly different concept than question #7. 
Using a Pearson Correlation the two questions were found to be only 
moderately correlated (r = .596). Significant main effects of both 
interactional fairness and instrumentality were indicated by question 
#7 (interactional fairness p<.05; instrumentality p<.001). Subjects in 
conditions of high interactional fairness rated procedural justice 
higher (M=4.96) than subjects in conditions of low interactional 
fairness (M=4.23>. With respect to instrumentality, subjects in 
conditions of high instrumentality rated procedural justice higher 
(M =5.441 than subjects in conditions of low instrumentality (M = 3 .75).
Unexpectedly, neither independent variable was significant
using question #5. Scrutiny of the questionnaire items indicated that
/
question #7 may have been a more precise question, while question 
#5 was more vague. Standard deviations on question #7 were found 
to be substantially smaller (high I., high I.F.=1.63; low I., high 
I.F.=2.06; high I., low I.F.=1.69; low I., low I.F.=1.46) than standard 
deviations in question #5 (high I., high I.F.=2.10; low I., high 
I.F.=2.12; high I., low I.F.=2.23; low I., low I.F.=1.85), which suggests 
that question #7 was indeed more easily interpreted. Additionally, 
Question #7 more precisely reflects procedural justice questions used
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Table 9
ANOVA: (Question 5) Procedural Justice Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)





Total 4 6 0 .9 9 103 4.48
Explained 27.8 3 9.27
IF 10.47 1 10.47 2.42
I 9 .24 1 9 .24 2.13
IF x I 8 .09 1 8 .09 1.87
Residual 4 3 3 .1 9 100 4 .33
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
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Table 10
ANOVA: (Question 1) Procedural Justice Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness OF) and Instrumentality (II





Total 391 .03 103 3 .80
Explained 93 .88 3 3 1 .2 9
IF 13.88 1 13.88 4.67*
I 7 4 .4 6 1 7 4 .4 6 25.06**
IF x I 5 .54 1 5 .54 1.86
Residual 2 9 7 .1 5 100 2.97
*p<.05 **p<.001.
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in previous research by Lind and Tyler (1988). With the preceding 
points in mind, the results will be discussed using procedural justice 
results obtained by procedural justice question #7.
A post hoc inspection of procedural justice question #7 (least 
significant squares) revealed significant differences (£<.05) between 
the low interactional fairness, low instrumentality condition and all 
other conditions. Subjects experiencing low interactional fairness 
along with low instrumentality of voice rated procedural justice 
lower (Mj=3.15) than subjects experiencing high interactional fairness 
and low instrumentality of voice (M =4.351: subjects experiencing low 
interactional fairness and high instrumentality of voice fM=5.31): and 
subjects experiencing high interactional fairness and high 
instrumentality of voice (M_=5.58).
Distributive Justice. Question #4, "How accurate (fair) were the 
ratings given to you by your supervisor?", and question #14, "Rate 
the fairness of your not getting a merit raise." were designed to 
measure perceptions of distributive justice. Each is a 9-point scale 
item. Unfortunately one of the questions proved to be somewhat 
problematic.
Table 11 shows the ANOVA results for question #14. Subjects 
did not significantly differ in their responses to the question. In 
hindsight the results seem to reflect the poor quality of the question 
rather than a statement about distributive justice. Specifically, there 
are two fundamental problems with the question. First, it indicates 
to the respondent that he/she does not receive a merit raise, which is
Table 11
ANOVA: Distributive Justice Ratings as a Function of Interactional
Fairness OF) and Instrumentality (1) (Question 14)





Total 4 1 1 .0 5 103 3.99
Explained 6.51 3 2.17
IF 5 .54 1 5 .54 1.37
I .35 1 .35 .09
IF x I .62 1 .62 .15
Residual 4 0 4 .5 4 100 4.05
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
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inconsistent with the design of the performance appraisal scenario.
In fact, the subjects leave the scenario without knowing the end 
results of the performance evaluation. Secondly, the wording of the 
question suggests a hypothetical question somewhat detached from 
the actual experience of the subjects. For these reasons, it would be 
inappropriate to interpret the question with implications regarding 
distributive justice.
Question #4 does not contain the before mentioned flaws of 
question #14. Table 12 displays the results of an ANOVA procedure 
indicating a significant main effect for interactional fairness (g<.05). 
Given the results of question #4, subjects in the low interactional 
fairness conditions apparently perceived their evaluations as less fair 
(M_=2.83) than their counterparts in the high interactional fairness 
conditions fM =3.12). Across conditions subjects received the same 
objectively unfair evaluation, yet subjects who were given high 
interactional fairness perceived the evaluation as more fair than 
subjects who were given low interactional fairness.
The instrumentality conditions did not affect perceptions of the 
fairness of the evaluation. A significant main effect for 
instrumentality was not found. This result may be largely due to 
the particular design of this study. Normally one would expect that 
having instrumental voice in a procedure would affect subjects’ 
perceptions of fairness of the outcomes associated with the 
procedure. However, one important aspect of this particular 
performance appraisal system must be considered when discussing
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Table 12
ANOVA: (Question 41 Distributive Justice Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (TF1 and Instrumentality (D





Total 3 8 4 .4 7 103 3.73
Explained 2 2 .8 5 3 7 .62
IF 20 .35 1 20 .35 5.63*
I .04 1 .04 .01
IF x I 2 .46 1 2 .46 .68
Residual 3 6 1 .6 2 100 3 .62
*p<.05.
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distributive justice. Subjects never receive a final evaluation from 
the area supervisor. The distributive justice measure of question #4 
does not reflect the final outcome of the procedure; rather, it reflects 
perceptions of a preliminary outcome. In order to test for 
distributive justice of the entire performance appraisal system, 
perceptions must be measured upon the completion of the process.
In this case perceptions of distributive justice must be measured 
after subjects receive a final evaluation from the area supervisor, 
which in turn affects their rate of pay.
Satisfaction. Overall satisfaction with the performance 
appraisal system was assessed with question #13 (9-point scale), 
"How satisfied are you with the performance appraisal system?". 
Table 13 displays the results of an ANOVA performed on the 
question, which indicate a significant main effect for instrumentality 
(£  .<.001). The results indicate instrumentality is an important aspect
of the performance appraisal system for subjects. Subjects were 
more satisfied with the system if they were given voice which was 
viewed as instrumental in raising their outcomes (M=5.08) than 
when they were given voice that was not perceived as instrumental 
in raising their outcomes (M=3.54).
Satisfaction was less affected by the interactional fairness 
manipulation experienced by subjects. Interactional fairness only 
approached significance (pK.101). Subjects in conditions of high 
interactional fairness rated their satisfaction with the system higher 
(M -4 .62) than subjects in conditions of low interactional fairness
ANOVA:
Table
Satisfaction Ratines as a
13
Function of Interactional Fairness
(IF) and Instrumentality (i).
Source of Variation Sum of d f Mean F
Squares Square
Total 4 4 0 .1 6 103 4 .27
Explained 81 .24 3 27 .08
IF 9.85 1 9.85 2 .74
I 6 1 .5 4 1 6 1 .5 4 17.15**
IF x I 9 .85 1 9.85 2 .74
Residual 3 5 8 .9 2 100 3 .59
**p<.001.
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(M=4.00). In answering question #13 subjects were only marginally 
effected by the condition of interactional fairness which they 
experienced. Satisfaction was measured with only one question, 
which unfortunately makes it difficult to interpret the nearly 
significant effect of interactional fairness. It was expected that 
satisfaction would be more highly effected by interactional fairness 
than indicated by responses to question #13.
An interaction of interactional fairness and instrumentality 
approached significance (pc.lO l). To help explain the interaction a 
post hoc, least significant differences, comparison of the low 
instrumentality, low interactional fairness condition with the other 
three conditions (each of which contained a high level of interactional 
fairness, or instrumentality, or both) was conducted. It showed that 
subjects in the low interactional fairness, low instrumentality 
condition were significantly (p.<.05) less satisfied (VL=2.92) than 
subjects in any other conditions (high I., high I.F. M =5.08: high I., low 
I.F. VI =5.08: low I., high I.F. M=4.15). These results are explained 
within the discussion section.
Due consideration. Question #12 ("Regarding the entire 
performance appraisal system, did you feel you had a chance to 
express your thoughts about your evaluation, and that your thoughts 
would be taken into consideration?”) was designed to assess 
perceptions of due consideration. ANOVA results can be found in 
Table 14. A significant main effect of instrumentality was found 
(Pl=-002), while no significant differences were found due to
5 7
Table 14
ANOVA: Due Consideration Ratings as a Function of Interactional
Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (D





Total 6 2 4 .1 2 103 6.06
Explained 66 .27 3 22 .0 9
IF 4.65 1 4.65 .83
I 5 8 .5 0 1 5 8 .5 0 10.49**
IF x I 3 .12 1 3 .12 .56
Residual 5 5 7 .8 5 100 5 .58
**p<.01.
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interactional fairness. Subjects in conditions of high instrumentality 
rated due consideration higher (M=5.62) than subjects in conditions 
of low instrumentality (M=3.94k The results are expected as 
instrumentality of voice is the usefulness of voice for impacting the 
decision leading to the final outcome. It would follow that those 
subjects who felt voice would be instrumental in increasing outcomes 
would feel they were given due consideration in the process.
Anger. In order to investigate emotional responses to the 
performance appraisal experience, question #11 was included in the 
questionnaire. It reads as follows; "In your role as the employee in 
the video, to what extent were you angry, mad or upset when filling 
out the Comment Form?" Table 15 shows the results of an ANOVA 
on the question. Neither interactional fairness nor instrumentality 
produced significant effects on responses to the question. This 
finding is not fully understood as it was expected that low conditions 
of instrumentality and low conditions of interactional fairness would 
result in more emotional responses from the subjects. Means of all 
conditions ranged from 6.04 to 6.81 on a 9-point scale indicating that 
subjects were angry when filling out the Comment Forms, however 
they did not differ due to conditions. A likely explanation is that the 
anger is related to outcomes rather than conditions of interactional 
fairness or instrumentality. A Pearson correlation between 
responses to the anger question (#11) and the outcome fairness 
question (#4) shows that the two questions are related (r = -.575).
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Table 15
ANOVA: Anger Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IFi
and Instrumentality (Ti





Total 4 4 6 .5 3 103 4 .3 4
Explained 10.41 3 3.47
IF 8.09 1 8 .09 1.85
I 1.16 1 1.16 .27
IF x I 1.16 1 1.16 .27
Residual 4 3 6 .1 2 100 4 .36
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
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As subjects rate the fairness of their outcomes lower, they rate their 
anger as higher.
Voice intent. Two questions were designed to assess subjects' 
intentions when filling out the Comment Forms. Question #3 ("When 
filling out the Comment Form was your purpose to try to raise your
ratings?") was designed to assess instrumentality intentions of
subjects. The second intent question (#9) was designed to assess 
expressive intentions of subjects. It reads as follows; "When filling 
out the Comment Form were you trying to simply express your 
feelings, regardless of whether or not your ratings would be raised?" 
Responses to each question were measured using 9-point scales. 
Results from separate ANOVA procedures can be found in tables 16 
and 17 respectfully. As shown in the tables, no significant effects 
were found for either question.
Unfortunately, the two questions seem to have been difficult to 
interpret. Standard deviations for question #3 were quite high (high 
I., high I.F.=2.48; low I., high I.F.=2.68; high I., low I.F.- 2 .51; low I.,
low I.F.-2.75), as were the standard deviations of responses to
question #9 (high I., high I.F.=1.88; low I., high I.F.=2.36; high I., low 
I.F.=2.48; low I., low I.F.=2.38) indicating that subjects may have had 
a difficult time interpreting the questions, or subjects derived varied 
interpretations. Additionally, the means of all conditions in both 
questions were high ranging from 6.23 to 7.15 in question #3 and 
6.65 to 7.23 in question #9. Arguably question #3 could have 
produced high ratings due to demand characteristics of the question,
Table 16
ANOVA: Instrumental Voice Intention Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (Is)





Total 7 4 2 .2 9 103 7.21
Explained 63 .1 7 3 21 .0 6
IF .47 1 .47 .07
I 16.16 1 16.16 2.38
IF x I .01 1 .01 .00
Residual 6 7 9 .1 2 100 6.79
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
Table 17
ANOVA: Expressive Voice Intention Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF") and Instrumentality (D





Total 5 2 6 .5 4 103 5.11
Explained 4 .42 3 1.47
IF 1.63 1 1.63 .31
I .01 1 .01 .00
IF x I 2 .78 1 2 .78 .53
Residual 5 2 2 .1 2 100 5 .22
Note. No comparisons were significant at p<.05.
6 3
while question #9 may have suffered from the same problem, 
resulting in subjects asserting positive responses to the questions. 
The purpose of the two questions was to assess intentions of voicing 
instrumentally and intentions of voicing expressively. Due to the 
apparent ambiguity of subjects interpretations of the questions, the 






The theoretical basis of this thesis suggests that two types of 
voice may be employed by people faced with different types of 
situations. As described earlier a distinction between instrumental 
voice and expressive voice was expected to be apparent given the 
different conditions designed in this experiment. More specifically, 
main effects of instrumentality and interactional fairness were 
expected for each of the dependent variables of voice content.
According to the theoretical framework of this experiment, 
when subjects believe voice to be instrumental in increasing their 
outcomes from the allocation procedure, they are expected to voice 
instrumentally in an attempt to gain those increased outcomes. In 
effect, they adhere to the allocation process and provide rational 
arguments for a reevaluation of the allocation with the expectation 
that their outcomes will be increased. As the instrumentality 
manipulation checks have shown, subjects clearly understood their 
voice opportunities to have high or low instrumentality depending 
upon the experimental condition which they experienced. 
Theoretically, subjects in high instrumentality conditions should have 
used a more instrumental voice than subjects in low instrumentality 
conditions. This, however, was not the case. Subjects did not. differ 
by instrumentality condition in their use of instrumental voice.
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According to the group value model presented by Lind and 
Tyler (1988), interactional fairness should serve to provide an 
indication of group membership to subjects. As shown by M usante, 
Gilbert, and Thibaut (1983), the fair process effect can be produced 
even in cases where instrumentality is low. The Lind and Tyler 
group value theory suggests that it is the group membership 
associated with voice that produces the fair process effect when 
instrumentality is low. In relation to voice content, this study 
hypothesized a main effect of interactional fairness on instrumental 
use of voice. In conditions where they are given a high level of 
interactional fairness, subjects were expected to adhere to the 
allocation procedure by providing rational arguments for a 
reevaluation of the allocation process with the expectation or their 
outcomes increasing.
Manipulation checks of interactional fairness clearly showed 
that subjects differed in their perceptions of interactional fairness 
according to the experimental condition which they experienced. As 
the results have shown, contrary to the theoretical hypotheses of this 
study, subjects did not differ by interactional fairness condition in 
their use of instrumental voice.
Main effects of interactional fairness and instrumentality were 
also expected for the dependent variable of expressive voice, 
however neither was found. There were no significant differences 
between groups due to conditions of instrumentality or interactional 
fairness. On a rating scale of 1 to 4, means for all groups fell within
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the range from 1.65 to 1.89. Unexpectedly, expressive use of voice 
was rarely employed by subjects regardless of the experimental 
condition they experienced. The great majority of subjects were 
rated 1 or 2 on the 4-point expressive scale (93 subjects), while very 
few w ere  rated higher than 2 (11 subjects).
The results of the voice content measures suggest that there 
may not be two distinctly different forms of voice as defined by 
instrumental voice and expressive voice. This, however, is not 
conclusive and may be misleading for the following reason. The 
criteria developed to measure the two forms of voice (see Appendix 
A) were developed using the actual voice Comment Forms completed 
by subjects. Clear exemplars of each type of voice were used in 
developing the criteria. Clearly some subjects voiced expressively,
while other subjects voiced instrumentally as defined by each 
criterion.
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, it is possible that 
the criteria developed for measuring the content of voice are flawed. 
An inter-rater reliability of .85 was established for the 
instrumentality measure, but an inter-rater reliability of only .72 
was found for the expressive voice measures. This indicates that the 
rating criteria are not as clearly defined and understood as would be 
desired.
Equally likely is the possibility that the media used to 
document voice was inappropriate for capturing the theoretical 
differences of voice content. The written format allows subjects to
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spend ten minutes formulating and writing ideas, which may result 
in much different uses of voice than would occur in an immediate 
speech format. The two formats seem equally appropriate for the 
testing of voice content because each is a commonly used form of 
voice, but speech may result in different content than a written 
format.
A further look at the design of the study suggests a compelling 
explanation for the lack of main effects of instrumentality and 
interactional fairness on expressive and instrumental uses of voice. 
Perhaps the explanation lies in the specific scenario used in the 
study. As stated previously, manipulation checks showed that 
subjects were affected by the manipulations of interactional fairness 
and instrumentality. Thorough pilot testing served to refine the 
performance appraisal system in order to assure that it was realistic 
and believable. Care was taken to assure that subjects could identify 
with the employee in the scenario. It is quite possible that demand 
characteristics of the performance appraisal scenario and experiment 
in general were stronger factors than the independent variables in 
determining the type of voice used. More specifically, it is possible 
that most subjects did not consider an alternative to instrumental 
voice when filling out the comment forms, and filled out the form as 
they felt they were expected to do in the context of the experiment. 
They may have perceived the purpose of the comment form to be an 
explanation of the results, therefore, subjects may have been lead 
into using instrumental voice. This explanation would account for
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the lack of expressive voice in all conditions, and account for the high 
usage of instrumental voice in all conditions (79 subjects rated 3 or 
above on the 5-point rating scale).
One characteristic of the performance appraisal system that 
might inhibit expressive voice is the use of a third party in the 
process. The area supervisor was the target of the voice through the 
Comment Forms. Subjects believed the Comment Forms to be 
confidential, so the immediate supervisor would not be exposed to 
the voice. It is possible that subjects were more instrumental due to 
the fact that they were not directing their voice at the allocator of
the performance appraisal ratings.
The issue of the content of voice has not been approached in
the literature to date. Although the voice content results of the
present study do not support the hypotheses of the experiment, they 
do warrant further investigation into the content of voice. By 
refining the criterion and exploring new experimental scenarios, the 
content of voice may prove to be a substantial element in the current 
theory of procedural justice.
Procedural Justice
As hypothesized, main effects of instrumentality and 
interactional fairness were found for procedural justice. As 
predicted by the group value model of Lind & Tyler (1988), increases 
in interactional fairness resulted in increases of ratings of procedural 
justice. As predicted by the rational perspective model (Tyler, 
Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985), increases in the instrumentality of voice
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resulted in. increases in ratings of procedural justice. The findings 
lend support for each of the theories suggesting that the fair process 
effect may be a result of voice as an instrumental attempt to increase 
outcomes as well as an attempt to express values. The rational 
perspective on voice and the group value model are not competing 
theories; rather, they attempt to explain the positive effects of voice 
under different conditions.
As a high level of interactional fairness is expected to raise 
perceptions of fairness, and a high level of instrumentality is also 
expected to raise perceptions of fairness, a post hoc test was 
conducted to look at the low instrumentality, low interactional 
fairness condition compared to all other conditions, each of which 
contained a high level of interactional fairness or a high level of 
instrumentality, or both. Interestingly, the low interactional fairness, 
low instrumentality condition was indeed significantly different from 
all other conditions. A high level of interactional fairness was 
sufficient to raise perceptions of fairness regardless of the perceived 
instrumentality of voice. Also, a high level of instrumentality was 
sufficient to raise perceptions of fairness experienced by subjects.
The results add support to both the rational perspective model and 
the group value model.
Arguably, subjects could have construed high interactional 
fairness as an indication of process control which would translate 
into instrumentality for subjects' voice. Perhaps they understood 
fair treatment to indicate that the process would be enacted
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properly. If that were the case, the rational perspective of voice 
could explain both main effects, because both interactional fairness 
and instrumentality would essentially be related to the perceived 
instrumentality of voice. Manipulation checks, however, showed that 
subjects were clearly aware of the level of instrumentality associated 
with their voice opportunities. It seems clear that perceptions of 
fairness in low instrumentality conditions were raised not by 
instrumentality, but by something related to interactional fairness. 
According to the group value model, being given fair interpersonal 
treatment may have resulted in subjects perceiving themselves as 
part of the group or process. Due to their inclusion in the decision 
making process, perceptions of fairness could have been raised. The 
distinction between the two models is clear in cases where subjects 
are given low instrumentality. The group value model is the best 
explanation for the increased perceptions of fairness, even though 
voice is not associated with process control. The results are evidence 
of a cushion of support resulting from voice even when voice is not 
instrumental and not associated with process control.
Given that increased perceptions of procedural justice are 
associated with the two motivational elements of instrumentality and 
group association, this study attempted to distinguished these two 
elements of voice by content. As discussed previously, the study did 
not show that the two motivational elements of voice are 
distinguishable by content.
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Satisfaction. Satisfaction with the performance appraisal process was 
affected by the level of instrumentality perceived by subjects.
Subjects were more satisfied with the process if they perceived a 
high level of instrumentality. According to the rational perspective 
of voice (Tyler, Rasinski & Spodick, 1985), subjects are expected to 
be more satisfied in conditions where they are presented with a 
voice opportunity because it increases their likelihood of achieving 
desired outcomes.
In accordance with the group value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) 
increases in group affiliation should promote high satisfaction with 
the process. As subjects are given high interactional fairness they 
are expected to be more satisfied with the performance appraisal 
process than subjects who are given low interactional fairness. The 
results of this exploratory analysis suggest that satisfaction is indeed 
effected by level of interactional fairness; however, the effect is not 
conclusive because reliability of the satisfaction measure could not 
be determined.
As a high level of interactional fairness is expected to raise 
satisfaction with the performance appraisal process, and a high level 
of instrumentality is also expected to raise satisfaction with the 
performance appraisal process, a post hoc test was conducted to look 
at the low instrumentality, low interactional fairness condition 
compared to all other conditions, each of which contained a high level 
of interactional fairness or a high level of instrumentality, or both. 
Both models (rational perspective of voice and group value) are
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supported by the finding that the low interactional fairness, low 
instrumentality condition was significantly different from all other 
conditions. A high level of interactional fairness was sufficient to 
raise perceptions of fairness regardless of perceived instrumentality 
of voice, suggesting that group affiliation alone can increase 
satisfaction. A high level of instrumentality was sufficient to raise 
satisfaction regardless of the level of interactional fairness, 
suggesting that acquiring self interests alone can increase 
satisfaction.
Theoretical and Practical Implications of Voice.
The fact that the groups did not differ in their uses of voice 
across conditions of instrumentality and interactional fairness is 
important. Interestingly, subjects were just as instrumental in their 
voice in conditions where they were both treated very poorly and 
told that their voice would not be effective as they were when they 
were given a high level of interactional fairness and told that their 
voice would be instrumental in raising their outcomes. The question 
of interest is, why would subjects voice instrumentally when they 
are given unfair interaction and told that their voice opportunity will 
not produce results? The answer could lie in the demand 
characteristics of the situation as discussed previously. Arguably, 
however, those same demand characteristics may also exist in a real 
performance appraisal system resulting in a lack of differences in 
voice content, just as found in this study.
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As voice has been used in the past it has been treated purely 
as a form of process control, meaning an instrumental attempt at 
raising the outcomes of a procedure. With a value expressive 
component to voice identified by Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick (1985), it 
is clear that voice can raise perceptions of procedural justice even 
when the instrumentality of voice is low. The results of the present 
study suggest that the content of that voice may not be an indication 
of which component of voice is operating to increase perceptions of 
fairness. Instrumental voice was the chosen form even when 
subjects were aware that the voice would not be instrumental. By 
describing the value expressive component of voice, the group value 
model accounts for increased perceptions of fairness and satisfaction 
in cases where instrumentality is low. It seems that the value 
expressive component of voice is not distinguished from the 
instrumental component of voice by its content. As in the case of 
this study, instrumental voice may be used for value expressive 
purposes. This would explain the use of instrumental voice in 
conditions where voice would clearly not be instrumental, and it 
would explain the increases in procedural justice perceptions, and 
ratings of satisfaction.
The experiment did not produce conditions which resulted in 
subjects psychologically departing from the procedure as expected. 
The content of voice was not found to be indicative of a psychological 
exit from the procedures. Even in conditions where subjects were
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expected to psychologically depart from the procedure, they 
remained in the procedure by using instrumental voice.
There are important practical implications of the voice content 
results. As perceptions of procedural justice varied by condition, 
voice content did not. As satisfaction with the performance appraisal 
system varied according to condition, voice content did not. The 
implications of these findings are important from a managerial 
standpoint. In the performance appraisal system used in the study, 
there was no distinction between subjects who were more satisfied 
and subjects who were less satisfied. If the demand characteristics 
of the performance appraisal system result in voice with a uniform 
content, yet perceptions of procedural justice systematically differ, it 
may be easy to make incorrect assumptions about perceptions of 
procedural justice and satisfaction based on the content of the voice.
Additionally, it is important to understand the extent to which 
subjects adhered to the performance appraisal system. Apparently 
these subjects took behavioral cues from the situation and displayed 
"proper" behavior for a performance appraisal situation, even in 
conditions that indicated the "proper" behavior would not be 
effective. Behaviorally, subjects conformed to the situation rather 
strongly, yet their perceptions of fairness and satisfaction were not 
displayed in their voicing behavior. It is important to know that 
while some groups of subjects in this work situation were dissatisfied 
with the performance appraisal system and rated procedural justice 
quite lowly, they voiced in the same fashion as subjects who were
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satisfied with the performance appraisal system and who felt the 
procedure was fair. Given the negative consequences of low 
perceptions of procedural justice, such as lower ratings of institutions 
and authorities, lower evaluations of decisions and outcomes, lower 
satisfaction with systems, lowered perceptions of legitimacy of 
authority, lessened support for the institution, and less compliance 
with decision results (Lind & Tyler, 1988), it is important to know 
that uniform voice content does not indicate uniform perceptions of 
procedural justice or satisfaction.
In light of the previous discussion it is also important to point 
out a possible limitation of the results pertaining to satisfaction. The 
satisfaction of subjects was measured using only one 9-point 
questionnaire item. A more dependable measure would have 
included at least one other item to measure satisfaction.
Interactional fairness An important aspect of this study is the 
influence of interactional fairness on perceptions of procedural 
justice and distributive justice. Bies and Moag (1986) have argued 
that the interaction is an important aspect of a dispute resolution or 
allocation procedure. The findings of this study support the theory 
of Bies and Moag. Subjects given high interactional fairness rated 
their perceptions of procedural justice higher than subjects given a 
low level of interactional fairness. Additionally, subjects given a high 
level of interactional fairness rated distributive justice higher than 
subjects given a low level of interactional fairness. It is important to 
reiterate that the outcomes (performance ratings) of each condition
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in the experiment were identical. Increases in interactional fairness 
were associated with increases in perceptions of procedural justice 
and distributive justice. Simply raising the level of interactional 
fairness in a procedure such as the performance appraisal procedure 
raises the perceptions of fairness without adjusting outcomes. The 
magnitude of this finding is great, given the positive outcomes 
associated with higher levels of procedural justice and the negligible 
cost of increasing interactional fairness.
The study provides some support for the idea that interactional 
fairness affects overall perceptions of satisfaction. As in the case of 
increased perceptions of procedural justice, it may be possible to
increase levels of satisfaction with minimal effort and cost by
increasing the interactional fairness that is experienced during an 
allocation or dispute resolution procedure. The findings suggest that 
interactional fairness effects are important elements in the theory of 
procedural justice.
Instrumentality Another theoretically significant finding of the 
study lies in the importance of the perceived instrumentality of 
voice. When subjects perceived their voice opportunity to be 
instrumental in increasing their outcomes, they perceived the 
procedure as more fair. Although due consideration was measured 
using only one 9-point questionnaire item, it seems that subjects felt 
they had been given greater due consideration in the process when
they perceived high instrumentality of voice. This may have
contributed to increased perceptions of fairness. Subjects were also
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more satisfied with the performance appraisal system if they 
perceived voice to be instrumental in raising their outcomes.
The findings of this study suggest that both interactional 
fairness and instrumentality of voice should be carefully considered 
when designing an allocation or dispute resolution system. Unlike 
the case of interactional fairness, concrete changes of a system may 
be necessary in order to establish a clear instrumental voice 
opportunity, however. Another point of interest in the present study 
is that perceived instrumentality of voice may be something totally 
different from a formal policy regarding the instrumentality of voice. 
In the present study, subjects’ perceptions of the instrumentality of 
voice were manipulated through social cues. All subjects read the 
same information regarding the formal policy of voice, which 
indicated a clear formal opportunity for voice. Perceptions of 
instrumentality, however, were constructed using social information 
outside of the formal policies. Careful attention should be paid to 
formal policies regarding voice and informal information regarding 
the instrumentality of voice. A very instrumental voice opportunity 
defined by the policy of the organization may not be reflected in the 
perceptions of the people using the voice. Increasing perceptions of 
the instrumentality of voice should result in increased perceptions of 
procedural justice along with increased perceptions of satisfaction. 
Future Research
Although this experiment was designed with careful attention 
to detail and believability, the results should be tested outside of the
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confines of the experimental setting. An examination of the content 
of voice under real world situations would be helpful, especially in 
relation to the content of voice. It will be important to know the 
variation of voice content in situations where the outcome has 
relevance to the subjects’ lives rather than situations where the 
outcome is hypothetical.
Additional pretesting of questionnaire items would greatly 
enhance the clarity of the results of this study. Particular attention 
should be paid to measures of procedural justice, distributive justice, 
and intentions of voicing behavior. Additional measurements of 
satisfaction, due consideration and anger should be developed to 
avoid the ambiguity of single item measurements and to increase the 
reliability of the measures. Pretesting of the experimental materials 
is also recommended to determine the extent of possible demand 
characteristics. It is quite possible that the materials in this study 
promoted a rational voice response in subjects.
Another avenue for future research is to modify the scenario 
developed for this experiment. Specifically, the target of voice and 
the media of voice should be examined further. The scenario 
becomes slightly unrealistic as the subjects voice to their area 
supervisor, rather than to their immediate supervisor. As discussed 
previously, the content of voice may be affected by the target. What 
would the results have been if subjects voiced to their immediate 
supervisor? Additionally, the content of voice may very well be 
affected by the written format. Perhaps a more spontaneous or
7 9
transient opportunity for voice would have been more natural, and 
would have produced more expressive voice as predicted in this 
study. What would the results have been if voice was measured in 
its audible form?
In each of the conditions of the present study, subjects were 
allowed a voice opportunity. Further research should investigate the 
present findings as compared to conditions that do not allow for 
voice. In line with the fair process effect, the lack of voice should 
produce lower ratings of procedural justice. Of particular interest 
would be the effects of instrumentality in conditions offering a voice 
opportunity as opposed to conditions not offering a voice 
opportunity. The present study is well designed for such a test, 
which may show the fair process effect in conditions without process 
control.
The study is also well designed for an investigation of the 
frustration effect defined by Folger (1977). By expanding the 
scenario, and including a final evaluation from the area supervisor, 
perceptions of procedural justice and distributive justice could be 
measured at the completion of the procedure, which would provide 
subjects with information regarding the effectiveness of their voice. 
An additional manipulation of outcome increases would present a 
clear investigation of the frustration effect.
Finally, any alterations to the present study should include 
investigation of the effects of individual differences between subjects 
on voice use. Perhaps variations in amounts of expressive voice and
8 0
instrumental voice are closely linked to individual differences in 
subjects, as well as interactional fairness or instrumentality of voice.
8 1
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Appendix A.
Voice Content Rating Criterion
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I n s t r u m e n t a l i t y
5. Specifically states supporting facts from four (4) of the 
following categories:
production accuracy (1 missort per 3000 sorted)
production speed (1800 per hour)
attendance (1 day late, 3 days absent) 
production quality (Supervisor is responsible for filled 
slot problem.) 
safety methods (no safety incidents)
4. Specifically states supporting facts from 3 of the above 
categories.
3. Specifically states at least one supporting fact from one of the 
following categories:
production accuracy (1 missort per 3000 sorted)
production speed (1800 per hour)
attendance (1 day late, 3 days absent)
2. States no specific facts. Makes general reference to 
"deservingness", but no factual support is provided, OR
Discounts the ratings but does not provide facts. DOES NOT
fully agree with ratings.
1. Agrees with the "no merit raise" decision of the immediate 
supervisor, OR makes no argument to influence ratings.
8 8
E x p r e s s i v e n e s s
4. Extreme dissatisfaction or satisfaction with ratings, supervisor, 
process or organization AND
Derogatory adjectives or names directed at ratings, supervisor,
process, or organization, OR
uses offensive swear words, OR
extreme sarcasm interpreted as name calling OR
apologizes profusely and promises to improve
3. May be sarcastic. Comments on dissatisfaction or satisfaction 
with ratings, supervisor, organization. Uses strong adjectives or 
punctuation.
2. Minor amount of affect. Expresses satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with ratings, supervisor, organization (as 
opposed to agreement and disagreement). Claims he or she has 
been treated unfairly or fairly.
1. Logical, calm comments. May agree or disagree with ratings, 
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CONSENT FORM
TITLE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY
EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS OF A PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEM 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE
You are invited to participate in a research study of a performance 
appraisal system.
BASIS FOR SUBJECT SELECTION
You were selected as a potential subject because you are an 
English-speaking adult.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to assess people's perceptions of a 
particular performance appraisal system.
EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURES
This study will take about one hour to complete. The following are 
the procedures you will undergo as a subject in this study:
You will read material pertaining to a particular performance 
appraisal system. The information will include a description of 
the system and perceptions of employees affected by the system.
You will be given information pertaining to the performance of one 
particular employee at the company, and you will be asked to 
identify with the employee as if you actually work for the company 
and your performance is being evaluated.
You will then watch a videotape of the employee receiving job 
performance feedback from his/her supervisor in the form of a 
performance appraisal feedback session, and complete a comment form 
regarding the evaluation.
Upon completion of the study you will be asked to fill out a 
questionnaire pertaining to the study, and you will be given a full 
debriefing and explanation of the study.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
There are no known risks or discomforts that you will experience. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS
There are no known direct benefits that you will personally receive 
by participating in this study. You will be given the opportunity 
after the study to gain a full understanding of the study and the 
current research.
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION
Your psychology course instructor has alternatives to research 
participation available to you as means of earning extra credit 
toward your course grade.
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
Should you choose to participate, you will receive two extra credit 
points to be applied to your psychology course grade.
ASSURANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Your responses during the study are recorded by subject number 
rather than by name. Thus your identity will not be associated i n  
any way with the information that you provide.
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE STUDY
Participation is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to 
participate will not affect your present or future relationship 
with the University of Nebraska. If you decide to participate, you 
are free to withdraw from this study at any time.
OFFER TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
If you have any questions, you may ask them before agreeing to 
participate in this study. If you think of any additional 
questions later, please feel free to contact one of the 
investigators below.
If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research 
subject you may contact the University of Nebraska Institutional 
Review Board (IRB), telephone 402/559-6463.
YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE 
IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY. YOUR SIGNATURE CERTIFIES THAT YOU HAVE 
DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE INFORMATION 
PRESENTED. YOUR SIGNATURE ALSO CERTIFIES THAT YOU HAVE HAD AN 
ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS STUDY WITH THE INVESTIGATOR 
AND YOU HAVE HAD ALL YOUR QUESTIONS ANSWERED TO YOUR SATISFACTION. 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM TO KEEP.
IN MY JUDGEMENT THE SUBJECT IS VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY GIVING 
INFORMED CONSENT AND POSSESSES THE LEGAL CAPACITY TO GIVE INFORMED 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY.
Signature of Subject Date
Signature of investigator Date
Investigat
Advisor:




Policy Implementation Procedures VI 13
Performance Evaluation
13(a) Employee performance in the envelope sorter position 
will be evaluated every six month period, beginning 3 0 days 
after the date of hire.
13(b) Envelope Sorters will be evaluated initially by their 
immediate supervisors. Evaluations meetings will take place 
during working hours, and will not exceed 3 0 minutes.
13(c) A Comment Form will be given to each employee 
following evaluation by the immediate supervisor. It will 
be used by the employees to voice any concerns or reactions 
they may have regarding the performance evaluation. The 
employee will attach the Comment Form to the supervisor's 
rating form, place them in an envelope, and forward them to 
the area supervisor. The final evaluation will be made by 
the area supervisor using both the immediate supervisor's 
rating form and the confidential Comment Form.
13(d) The following dimensions of the envelope sorter's 
performance will be evaluated:
Attendance A percentage of time when the employee is 
present during scheduled working time. This shall 
include tardiness, absenteeism and excessive sick 
time.
Production speed A summary of timings taken during 
employee's production time. Speed will be measured in 
terms of envelopes sorted per hour.
Production quality A rating of the quality of sorting 
done by the employee [see section III 2(b) for sort 
quality criterion].
Safety methods A percentage of time when the employee 
adheres to safe working methods [see section VII 3(a) 
for listing of safe working methods].
Production accuracy The percentage of envelopes which 
are sorted to their correct destinations.
13(e) Performance will be rated with the following 5-point 
rating scale [see section V 12(c) for descriptions of the 
five anchors]:
1.—  unacceptable
2.—  needs improvement
3.—  minimally acceptable
4.—  good (merit raise)
5.—  excellent (merit raise)
Transfer Requests
14(a) Any employee wishing to transfer positions from one 
work shift to another must submit a formal written request 
for transfer to his/her immediate supervisor.
14(b) Transfer position options will be posted each month 
in the personnel office. Transfer requests must be made for
-38-
The following information will aid you in understanding 
the envelope sorter position, and the role which you are 
going to assume. Please read the information carefully in 
order to understand the job from the perspective of an 
employee. In order for you to assume the role of an envelope 
sorter for this experiment, it is important for you to 
understand various aspects of the job and your hypothetical 
performance.
The company which you work for is a national package 
delivery company, specializing in the delivery of packages 
and envelopes. You work part time in the production plant in 
order to gain extra money while going to school.
You have worked at the company for about two years and 
worked in several positions throughout the production area. 
You have loaded packages into trucks, unloaded packages, 
sorted boxes, and now you sort envelopes. In total you have 
had four different jobs within the production area. .You have 
been able to select the jobs that you desire within the 
company because you have been successful in each previous 
position. You have received merit raises after each 
performance evaluation because you are a good employee and 
your ratings are quite high. You are aware that it is vary 
rare that an employee does not rate high enough to obtain a 
merit raise, because normally everybody rates a four or above 
on each rating scale.
Your current position of envelope sorter requires 
sorting envelopes to every destination in the United States. 
You sort individual envelopes into 3 0 different slots, which 
are located in front of a sorting table. You stand at a long 
sorting table along with six other envelope sorters and sort 
the envelopes from large boxes. You read the address of each 
envelope and put the envelope into one of the slots depending 
upon its destination. All of the envelopes are arranged so 
you can easily read the addresses. Your primary duty is to 
sort the envelopes. Other employees are used to bring more
envelopes for you and to empty out your sorting slots when 
they are full. Your normal working shift is four hours.
You have been in the job for about six months and you 
are able to sort at about the same rate as the other 
employees in the envelope sorting area. You have been timed 
frequently by your supervisor and the your production speed 
is about 1800 envelopes per hour (the production speed 
requirement is 1500 envelopes per hour so your rate is 3 00 
better than the minimum). You are also about as accurate as 
the other envelope sorters. Your production accuracy rate is 
one envelope missorted for every 3 000 sorted correctly (the 
minimum acceptable production accuracy rate is one missorted 
envelope per 2000 envelopes sorted, so your production 
accuracy rate is better than the minimum requirement.) You 
feel comfortable in the job, as you have for the last three 
jobs that you have had in the production area. You have 
acquired a strong sense of pride in your work.
In order to sort envelopes it was necessary for you to 
learn the zip-code organization. You were tested over the 
zip-code material and the test results were satisfactory. In 
conversations with other envelope sorters, you have been told 
that you are a very good envelope sorter. You believe that 
your performance is quite good because you have really 
applied yourself to the envelope sorting position. You have 
not had a performance evaluation yet because you have only 
been sorting envelopes for about six months.
You have been late to work only one time since you have
worked for the company and you have been absent from work on 
three occasions. Each time that you were absent, you called 
your supervisor to inform him that you would be using sick 
leave on that particular day. You have never been 
reprimanded or written up for disciplinary action.
The employee labor union conducted a company wide 
survey in January of 1989 to assess a wide variety of 
envelope sorter attitudes and perceptions about the company. 
The following information shows the results of the survey 
questions that relate to the performance appraisal system. 
The first page is a general summary of envelope sorters' 
responses. The remaining two pages show the questions used 
in the survey and the responses made by an envelope sorter 
currently working at the envelope sorting position.
Please read the information carefully in order for you 
to gain an understanding of the performance appraisal system 




(section 6-c: GENERALIZED SUMMARY)
2/12/89
1. Envelope sorters generally feel that the comment form 
used in the performance appraisal system is not very useful.
2. Envelope sorters are generally aware of the performance 
appraisal process and how it works.
3. The majority of envelope sorters are aware that 
performance is evaluated every six months.
4. Most envelope sorters believe that only a very small 
percentage of employees do not receive merit raises.
5. The great majority of envelope sorters know that a
rating of 4 or above on each rating scale is needed in order 
to earn a merit raise.
6. The great majority of envelope sorters believe that the
comment forms used in the performance appraisal system are
strictly confidential, and that their immediate supervisors 
never know what is written on the forms.
7. The majority of envelope sorters report that evaluation 
feedback sessions take place during working hours and are 




(section 4: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES)
2/12/89
Employee number 5 0 7 - 7 2 - 7 7 5 0 ______
1. How often is your performance evaluated?
—  about every six months.
2. Have you ever received an unrepresentative performance 
evaluation?
—  Yes, and I used the comment form, but it didn't help 
at all. My ratings from the area supervisor were 
exactly like the ratings my immediate supervisor 
gave me.
3• Who evaluates your performance?
—  First my immediate supervisor does and then the area 
supervisor after that.
4. Does your supervisor have enough contact with you to 
accurately evaluate your performance?
—  He can't watch me all of the time, but I guess he 
sees me working quite a bit.
5. Do you feel that your comments on the comment form 
negatively effect your working relationship with your 
immediate supervisor?
—  No, it couldn't, the union makes sure of that. The 
immediate supervisors couldn't see those comments 
even if they wanted to.
6. What rating is needed to qualify you for a merit raise?
—  I just need to get at least a 4 on all of the rating 
scales. Anything lower is no good.
7. Is the 5-point rating scale used in the performance 
evaluation clearly understandable?
—  Yes, it is pretty simple really. Five is the best 
and one is the worst.
8. How many employees receive merit raises after performance 
evaluations ?
—  Almost everybody. Actually you have to be a pretty 
bad worker to miss your merit raise.
Employee Perceptions '89
p. 13
9. Are your performance appraisal meetings scheduled at 
convenient times?
—  Yes, most of the time they are short and to the 
point, and they are always on company time.
10. Can you think of a time when an employee«s initial 
ratings by the immediate supervisor were changed by the area 
supervisor because of comments written by the employee on 
the comment form?
—  No. I don’t think the comment form works. The 
final ratings are always the same as the first 
ratings done by the immediate supervisor.
The employee labor union conducted a company wide 
survey in January of 1989 to assess a wide variety of 
envelope sorter attitudes and perceptions about the company. 
The following information shows the results of the survey 
questions that relate to the performance appraisal system. 
The first page is a general summary of envelope sorters' 
responses. The remaining two pages show the questions used 
in the survey and the responses made by an envelope sorter 
currently working at the envelope sorting position.
Please read the information carefully in order for you 
to gain an understanding of the performance appraisal system 




(section 6-c: GENERALIZED SUMMARY)
2/12/89
1. Envelope sorters generally feel that the comment form 
used in the performance appraisal system is very useful.
2. Envelope sorters are generally aware of the performance 
appraisal process and how it works.
3. The majority of envelope sorters are aware that 
performance is evaluated every six months.
4. Most envelope sorters believe that only a very small 
percentage of employees do not receive merit raises.
5. The great majority of envelope sorters know that a
rating of 4 or above on each rating scale is needed in order 
to earn a merit raise.
6. The great majority of envelope sorters believe that the
comment forms used in the performance appraisal system are
strictly confidential, and that their immediate supervisors 
never know what is written on the forms.
7. The majority of envelope sorters report that evaluation 
feedback sessions take place during working hours and are 




(section 4: INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RESPONSES)
2/12/89
Employee number 5 0 7 - 7 2 - 7 7 5 0 ______
1. How often is your performance evaluated?
—  about every six months.
2. Have you ever received an unrepresentative performance 
evaluation?
—  No, because I fill out the Comment Form and my 
ratings get raised by that when the area supervisor 
makes the final evaluation.
3. Who evaluates your performance?
—  First my immediate supervisor does and then the area 
supervisor after that.
4. Does your supervisor have enough contact with you to 
accurately evaluate your performance?
—  He can't watch me all of the time, but I guess he 
sees me working quite a bit.
5. Do you feel that your comments on the comment form 
negatively effect your working relationship with your 
immediate supervisor?
—  No, it couldn't, because those forms are very 
confidential. The immediate supervisors couldn't 
see them even if they wanted to.
6. What rating is needed to qualify you for a merit raise?
—  I just need to get at least a 4 on all of the rating 
scales. Anything lower is no good.
7. Is the 5-point rating scale used in the performance 
evaluation clearly understandable?
—  Yes, it is pretty simple really. Five is the best 
and one is the worst.
8. How many employees receive merit raises after performance 
evaluations?
—  Almost everybody. Actually you have to be a pretty 
bad worker to miss your merit raise.
Employee Perceptions '89
p. 13
9. Are your performance appraisal meetings scheduled at 
convenient times?
—  Yes, most of the time they are short and to the 
point, and they are always on company time.
10. Can you think of a time when an employee's initial 
ratings by the immediate supervisor were changed by the area 
supervisor because of comments written by the employee on 
the comment form?
—  Yes. I know of several people who have filled out 
the comment form and ended up with higher ratings 
after the area supervisor looked them over.
EMPLOYEE EVALUATION FORM
Semi-annual performance appraisal
Employee _________________________  Date of hire ^ ^  *7
Position / v  p  e
Immediate supervisor •" ‘-1 6~v>, //< *•- ^ »i S .
Area supervisor ________________________
Rate the above employee along each of the five job 
performance dimensions. Ratings must not deviate from the 
defined scale values. (Ratings must be either 1,2,3,4, or
5. No 1/2 values or double values are permitted.)







1 2 3 f?N 5
1 2 ( 3 ) 4 5
1 2 3 5
1 2 3 < ? ' ) 5
Ratings of 4 or above on all performance dimensions results 
in an employee merit raise. A single rating below 4 
disqualifies employee for a merit raise.
I^P  A  i
Supervisor's signature date
Employee's signature date
Merit Raise Yes  No__
EMPLOYEE COMMENTS
This is the second part of your performance evaluation. You 
will attach this form to the evaluation form given to you by 
your immediate supervisor, and place both forms in the 
envelope provided for you. They will be forwarded to your 
area supervisor, who will make your final evaluation. You 





Please complete the following questionnaire by responding to each 
question. Circle the number on the scale that most closely represents 
the way that you feel. Be sure to read the scale values for each question 
before circling a number. Feel free to circle the extreme numbers such 
as "1" or "9" if that is how you feel. Please carefully consider each 
q u e s t io n .
1. How useful did you perceive the Comment Form to be for increasing 
your performance ratings?
Not at all M oderately V ery
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. To what extent was your supervisor courteous and polite to you.
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9
3. When filling out the Comment Form, was your purpose to try to raise 
your ratings?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. How accurate (fair) were the ratings given to you by your 
supervisor?
Not at all Moderately Very
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. Overall, do you feel the performance appraisal process (comment 
form, supervisor ratings, etc.) was fair?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. Did you feei that you as the employee were given fair interpersonal 
treatment in the videotape?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7. How much do you feel the entire performance appraisal system 
(comment form, supervisor ratings, etc.) results in fair performance 
evaluations for employees?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8. In this company, is the immediate supervisor permitted to read your 
comments on the comment form? No  Y e s  t
9. When filling out the Comment Form, were you trying to simply 
express your feelings, regardless of whether or not your ratings would 
be raised?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10. Did you feel your ratings could be raised by the area supervisor 
after he read your comment form?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
11. In your role as the employee in the video, to what extent were you 
angry, mad or upset when filling out the comment form?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9
12. Regarding the entire performance appraisai system, did you feel you 
had a chance to express your thoughts about your evaluation, and that
your thoughts would be taken into consideration?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
13. How satisfied are you with the performance appraisal system?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
14. Rate the fairness of you not getting a merit raise.
Not at all fair Somewhat fair Very fair
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
15. How likly is it that your immediate supervisor would ever see your 
comments on the comment form?
Not at all M oderately V ery
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
16. To what extent were you able to identify with the employee in the 
video in order to role play in the performance appraisal process?
Not at all M oderately Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9
17. Have you ever had your performance rated on an actual job where 
you have worked? N o  Y e s  t
18. Please indicate your sex. M ale  Female
